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Standard work on  costly state verification, monitoring, and  auditing generally assumes 
perfect  signals  about  the  underlying  state,  especially  in  questions  about  financial 
contracting.  Relaxing  that  assumption  has  several  intriguing  consequences.  Most 
imperfect audits turn out to be  useless, and those that are useful cannot be  ranked by 
conventional criteria such as Blackwell's information measure.  Thus, the notion of  "more" 
or "less" information becomes problematic. 
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Costly state verification, monitoring, or auditing often  shows up  in  models of 
informational economics and finance.  Some papers use it to explain individual contracts, 
such  as  Townsend  (1979),  which  introduces  the  concept,  and  Mookherjee  and  Png 
(1989), which explores random auditing.  Others extend this work to look at financial 
institutions, such as Diamond (1984) and Williamson (1986).  In  all of  these cases, the 
audit/monitoring technology, or state verification, is perfect in the sense that the true state 
is revealed with certainty.  Much less work has been done using imperfect monitoring, 
where the  signal gives only probabilistic information about the state.  The reluctance 
stems in part from the belief that this generalization would  be  messy  and complicated 
without yielding substantially new  insights.  For example, Dye (1986), in considering a 
principal-agent model,  finds  he  can  generalize  his  results  to  the  case  of  imperfect 
monitoring with more restrictive and less plausible assumptions. Mookherjee and Png (p. 
414) assert that  "it may be verified, by  continuity arguments, that our results extend to 
the case when there are 'small' errors  in auditing." 
The situation is in fact quite different for the standard costly state verification 
model.  When  signals about  states are  uncertain, there is  generally  no  advantage to 
monitoring. Information in this class of models is useless unless it is perfect;  Even in the 
exceptional cases, this result means that the natural metrics on information break down: It 
becomes  difficult  to  rank  monitoring  schemes,  even  using  such  powerful  tools  as 
Blackwell's (1  95  1, 1953) Measure of Informativeness. 
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proceed on a case-by-case basis, to mix imperfect signals with perfect monitoring, or to 
rely on other types of  imperfect monitoring, such as those used by Gorton and Haubrich 
(1987), where only a minimum effort  level can be  verified, or Lacker  and Weinberg 
(1989), where some fraction of output can be hidden. 
After presenting a simple two-state example, section 2 proves the general case and 
then  discusses  the  exceptions.  Section  3  shows  the  deficiencies  of  Blackwell's 
information measure in this model, and section 4 concludes. 
2.  Imperfect State Verification 
In  the model economy discussed here, a risk-averse (possibly risk-neutral) agent 
has private information about his income, and a risk-neutral uninformed principal has the 
right to audit or monitor the agent.  For concreteness, I consider the agent as a borrower 
endowed with an investment project that needs one unit of funds to begin operation.  The 
borrower has no funds and must raise them externally from a lender, who may invest in 
the project or in a riskless alternative asset with gross return R.  A project that gets funded 
produces a random  income level  Yi  in  state i.  There are N possible  income levels: 
Y, < Y, <...< Y,.  A, is the probability of  state i occurring.  The  Ai 's thus describe the 
lender's prior distribution about the agent's income.  The project's  outcome is costlessly 
observed by the borrower, but this is private information.  Without any sort of  audit, the 
borrower can always claim that  the bad  state occurred and can transfer the minimum 
amount to the principal.  To make the problem interesting, we assume that this amount 
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utility he gets from an alternative investment; in other words,  Y; c R . 
The lender may pay  cost  y  to obtain a signal s about the income level actually 
realized.  We  assume  0  < y < Y, , so that  income  always  covers  audit  costs.  The 
conditional  probability  n,  relates  the  signal  and  the  state;  that  is,  it  denotes  the 
probability of getting signal s  given state i.  When income truly equals  Y; ,  n, = Pr[sli]. 
Recall that by  the  definition of  conditional probability,  li,  =  1.  One very natural 
signal is the sort announcing "The true state is 5,"  which signals that  Y5  is actual income. 
The signal is of  course uncertain, and  li,,  tells us the probability that if  the state really is 
5, we will receive the signal telling us that it is 5.  The formulation, however, is more 
general.  The number of possible signals, S, need not equal the number of  income states, 
N.  We might  have four income states, but get a signal saying only that income was good 
or bad.  Conversely, income may  depend on  whether  it  rained or not,  signaled by  a 
barometer reading of  low, average, or high.  The general signaling literature even allows 
continuous signals with finite states (Kihlstrom [1984]). 
The sequence of events has two stages.  In  the first, the project owner proposes 
contracts specifying (ex post) state-contingent payoffs to the potential lender.  The lender 
then decides between lending to the borrower or investing in the riskless asset.  When the 
borrower obtains funding, the project  produces its output and the borrower  learns the 
state.  In the next stage, the borrower announces a state, whereupon the lender flips a coin 
and with probability pi  conducts an  audit.  The borrower then  makes  a transfer to the 
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signal received.  If  no audit occurs, the transfer  2;:  depends only on the announced state. 
In the second stage, lenders have no income of their own, so that all payments must come 
from the project, including not only transfer payments but also audit costs. 
An  eye toward financial contracting also results in some restrictions on transfers 
between the borrower and the investor (or the peasants and the lord).  First, the borrower 
must have non-negative consumption.  The lord cannot take more wheat than the farmer 
has grown.  Second, the  transfer must be  non-negative: The investor never  makes  an 
interest payment to the entrepreneur, as the lord never gives wheat to the farmers -- he 
hasn't any to give.'  This describes a world where the resources to be divided come from 
the agent's production, as in Border and Sobel (1987).  Plausible alternative worlds exist. 
For example, in Mookherjee and Png (1989), negative transfers provide insurance against 
bad states. 
Throughout  this  paper,  I  restrict  attention  to  incentive-compatible  direct 
mechanisms.  Hence,  transfers  between  the  agent  and  principal  depend only  on  the 
income level announced by the agent and on the signal received, or <,,  2;:  if no signal is 
sent.  This  may  represent  a  real  restriction.  Standard statements of  the  Revelation 
Principle  (Harris and  Townsend  [1981])  do  not  allow  messages  that  depend  on  the 
-  - -  -  - 
1 The agent can never claim to have more than the amount actually produced.  Think of 
the claim as delivering bushels of wheat to the investor.  The farmer may hold back (just 
as a businessman may hide profits), but he cannot deliver wheat that doesn't exist.  Gale 
and Hellwig (1985) emphasize this point. 
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verified information, the Revelation Principle does not hold. 
The lender is risk neutral and the agent is weakly risk averse with von-Neumann- 
Morgenstern utility function u, so that u is strictly increasing, differentiable, and concave. 
The agent's consumption must be non-negative, with the convention that u(O)=O.  This 
allows us to express the basic programming problem of the model as follows: 
(1)  rnax  x,  ki  xs  xis  [piu(x  -  c)  + (1 -  pi)u(y -  T)]  (Expected utility of 
(Fh,T,pi)  ' 
borrower) 
Subject to 
(2)  Vi~~s~is[p;~(~-~s)+(l-p;)~(~-T)l  2  (Incentive compatibility 
n.  [phu(Y;  -F,)+(l-ph)u(T  -Th)l vi,h  xs  1s  or reporting constraints) 
(3)  ~,A;~~Z,[P~F~-P~Y+(~-P~)TI~R  (Expected profit for principal) 
(4)  q -  es  2 0 
(5)  F-T 20 
(6)  cs  2 0 
(7)  T. 2y. 
(Non-negativity constraints) 
The problem, then, is to choose audit probabilities pi,  along with  transfers  T  and  cs 
dependent on the state, signal, and  audit, to maximize the borrower's expected utility 
subject to i) the incentive compatibility constraints, ii) a participation constraint for the 
lender, and iii) the appropriate non-negativity constraints. 
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conjunction with  the  form  of  the  reporting constraints (2),  guarantee  a  compact  set. 
Maximizing a continuous function, the agent's expected utility (1) over a compact set has 
a solution by the Maximum Value Theorem (see Bartle [1976], section 22).  Mookherjee 
and Png, who allow negative transfers, cannot invoke this theorem and provide a different 
existence proof.  In either case, actually calculating the optimum is  tricky.  The non- 
convexity  of  the  reporting  constraints  (2)  generally  precludes  the  use  of  Lagrange 
multipliers in these sorts of problems. 
A  simple 2x2  example exhibits  the techniques and  intuition.  The key  is the 
interaction  between  the  incentive  compatibility  and  non-negativity  constraints.  Let 
N=S=2, set the audit cost to zero, and ignore the possibility of  random audits.  In addition, 
let the conditional probability of each signal be strictly greater than zero, so that nis  > 0. 
Then,  the  reporting  constraint  (2)  implies  that  for  state  2, 
V, = n,,u(Y, -  F,,) +  n2,u(Y2 -  F,,)  2 n21~(Y2  -  ql)  +  n2,u(Y2 -  4,).  This says that the 
agent's  expected utility from telling the truth  -- correctly declaring 1=2 -- exceeds his 
utility from falsely declaring i=l. The uncertainty arises because the signal may confirm 
(s=l) or contradict (s=2) the declared state.  The non-negativity constraints force 4,  5  I: 
and  4,  I  I: .  Hence,  n,,u(Y, -  4,)  +  n,,u(Y,  -  F,,)  2 u(Y2 -  Y,)  .  The transfer to the 
principal can never exceed  Y,  : The principal cannot receive more in the good state than 
in  the bad  state.  If  this form  of  the problem  is to have  any  interest, the principal's 
expected profit (3) won't be met by this contract.  Partial information does not help, as the 
incentive compatibility constraints conflict with the expected profit constraint. 
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signal has shifted probabilities around, but it has not changed the nature of the problem. 
The principal cannot prove that the bad state did not occur and must therefore settle for 
the minimum possible payment. 
The technique, and intuition, generalize to more incomes and more signals. 
Proposition 1:  Let there be N income states and S signals.  If  zis  > 0  (strictly) for all s, 
then  for  ,  ,  and  pi  solving  (1)  subject  to  (2)-(7,  we  have  that 
Cia,  Cs  nis  [piFs -  piy  +  (1 -  piq)] I  I:.  That  is,  expected  profits never exceed the 
output of the lowest state. 
Proof:  The incentive compatibility constraints (2) yield 
Vi  =~~[~;~(~-~~)+(1-~;)~(~-1;)1  s  lS  2  Csn;s[~hu(x-~h)+(l-~h)u(~-~)l 
V i, h  for all i in  (1, 2, ... N}. In particular, 
v; 2 Csa[p1u(l:  -&,I+  (1- p,)u(): -Vl. 
Thus, by the non-negativity constraints (4) and (9, 
v;~Csxis[~,u(~-Y,)+(l-~,)~(~-K)I  =  ~s~is[~(~.-Y,)I=u(Y,-Y,). 
Risk  aversion, via  Jensen's  inequality, implies  that  the expected utility  of  an 
uncertain transfer with  expected value  Y, will  be lower than  the expected utility of  a 
certain transfer of  Y, . Hence, to satisfy the borrower's incentive compatibility constraint 
2 u(y -  Y,  ) ,  the largest expected transfer to the principal (lender) cannot exceed Y,  . 
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Of  course, with  sufficiently  low  opportunity cost  R,  the  principal  would  be 
satisfied with such a contract.  But if  we assume as above that  R > 6,  that is, if  the bank 
demands more than the lowest possible output (or the landlord demands more than  the 
worst possible  harvest), no  investment  will  take  place.  The  principal  cannot get  an 
acceptable return from the project.  We state this as: 
Corollary: If  Y, < R,  then (1) subject to (2)-(7) has no solution. 
An  alternative statement,  if  we  had  included  the  initial  investment  decisions, 
would note that the only solution sets the initial investment to zero; the project does not 
get funded. 
Imperfect information can  help if  some of  the conditional probabilities n,  are 
zero.  Receiving a particular signal may now definitely rule out some states and allow 
larger transfers. Returning to the simple two-state example will help to clarify this. 
Let the matrix of  n, be  lot5 51.  The first thing to notice here is that the 
certain state is 2:  If  you get a signal saying state 2, you  are in fact in that state.  If  the 
signal says state 1, you can't be sure. The reporting constraints are then 
= u(q -  4,)  2 u(0) 
V,  =0.5u(Y, -F,,)+O.5u(Y, -F,,)~O.~U(Y,-F;,)+O.~U(Y,  -4,). 
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allowing  F,,  to exceed  Y, -- a definite improvement.  Of  course, it's possible that the 
expected profit constraint is not met, but the zero in the first row  is a move in the right 
direction. 
The above example also shows that once we have added a zero in the first row, 
then  more zeros can  help  -- in  this case creating perfect information.  This intuition 
generalizes.  Putting a zero in  the first row  means that  some signals will  rule  out the 
lowest state. Adding more zeros can rule out more states. 
The sense in  which  information  is  generically useless  in  this  class of  models 
should now be clear.  Unless there are zeros in the first row (that is, unless the probability 
of  some signal given state 1 is zero), partial information adds nothing.  Consider { xis  ) as 
a random vector in  SNS,  drawn from an  absolutely continuous distribution.  Then it is 
only on a set of  (Lebesgue) measure zero'that partial information can improve upon the 
no-information case. 
3.  Blackwell's Information Criteria 
Using imperfect information leads to a natural desire for quantification.  Can we 
rank  signals by  how  much  information they  provide?  David  Blackwell  (195 1,  1953) 
provides an affirmative answer by proving the equivalence of several natural measures of 
informativeness, such as every information user preferring one signal, or one signal being 
noisier than another (see McGuire [I9861 or Kihlstrom [I9841 for expositions).  For our 
purposes, the most useful formulation is the one using Markov matrices.  Let P and Q be 
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more informative than Q (in the sense of Blackwell) if  there exists a Markov matrix M 
(x  m, =  1 and m, 20)  such that 
Unfortunately, the Blackwell  measure does not  work  for the problem at  hand. 
First, notice that one signal may be more informative than another and yet be unable to 
improve upon the outcome if there are no zeros in the first row.  An example would be 
Second, and conversely, adding zeros does not necessarily make the signal more 
informative in the sense of Blackwell. Working out these examples is not difficult.  Note, 
however, that adding a zero, leaving all other rows unchanged, and redistributing only the 
probability mass from the matrix  element reduced to zero  does not guarantee a more 
informative signal in the sense of Blackwell.  That is, we cannot find a Markov matrix M 
satisfying (6) when 
1 
In this case, the element m,, = --,  so M cannot be Markov. 
8 
Blackwell's  theorem  on  the  comparison  of  experiments  has  two  parts.  The 
sufficiency part shows that any decisionmaker will prefer a more informative signal to a 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9506.pdfless informative  one.  The necessity part  shows that  if  any decisionmaker  prefers one 
signal to another, the preferred signal will be more informative. 
In  the monitoring model  used  in this paper, a  weak form of  sufficiency holds. 
Adding noise, in the sense of  multiplying by a Markov matrix M, may remove a zero 
from the first row and hence make things worse.  Even if  adding noise does not remove 
the zero, a variant of the proof in Grossman and Hart's (1983) Proposition  13 shows that 
the added randomness does not help.  Where signals are useless, adding noise will have 
no  effect.  Finally,  adding  noise  will  never  put  a  zero  in  the  first  row  unless  the 
corresponding  columns  of  the  M  matrix  are  all  zero,  which  implies  that  all  the 
corresponding columns of  the transformed matrix  must also contain  only zeros.  This 
merely  drops one signal  from consideration, which  does nothing  to  help  monitoring. 
Thus, a less informative signal cannot be better in the monitoring model. 
The counterexamples (7) and (8) show that the necessity  side of  the Blackwell 
theorem fails in the monitoring model.  Risk-averse agents prefer one signal to another, 
even though that signal is not more informative in the sense of Blackwell.  This may not 
be surprising, as the monitoring model deals with incentives -- and thus with control -- in 
addition  to  estimation.  Even  so,  it  was  only  recently  that  Kim  (1995)  produced  a 
counterexample for the principal-agent modeL2 
2 See also the interesting work of Singh (1991). 
11 
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Extending models of  auditing, monitoring, and costly state verification to cases of 
imperfect signals seems a worthwhile goal.  However, except in special cases, imperfect 
signals  cannot  improve  upon  the  no-audit  case.  Likewise,  except  under  special 
circumstances, Blackwell's information  measure  does  not  describe the  quality of  the 
information  provided  by  the  signal.  The  special  cases  may  still  be  worth  studying, 
however, since these extremes may be the scenarios most likely to occur in the real world 
(Friedman [1965]).  Realistically, monitoring technology seems sufficiently advanced that 
a hugely profitable entrepreneur or farmer probably cannot appear truly destitute, even 
though he may hide or divert some funds.  In future research, I hope to see whether the 
special cases have interesting applications.  An  alternative approach would be to consider 
some  sort  of  two-stage  audit.  Then,  imperfect  information  could  provide  a  tighter 
distribution over the states, which in certain cases could then be verified perfectly. 
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